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Reviled Mothers1: 
 Custody Modification Cases Involving Domestic Violence 
MEGAN SHIPLEY* 
Consider the following custody case: Amy and Brandon Webb had a daughter 
together in March 2003.2 Their marriage ended about two and a half years later, and 
they agreed as part of their divorce to share parenting time equally.3 For the first 
year after the divorce, they were able to agree on an equal visitation schedule, but 
as of the summer of 2006, their daughter stayed with Amy most of the time and 
saw Brandon only every other weekend.4  
Amy started dating a man who was abusive. In the fall of 2007, he assaulted her 
and she escaped to a domestic violence shelter with her daughter, who was then 
about five years old.5 While at the shelter, Amy got an order of protection against 
her ex-boyfriend.6 Amy also became friends with another mother at the shelter, and 
they moved in together with their children when they left the shelter.7  
In January 2008, Amy started dating a new boyfriend and allowed him to stay 
overnight while her child was in the house.8 Her abusive ex-boyfriend violated the 
protective order at least once in early 2008.9 In March 2008, Brandon filed a 
motion to modify the parenting plan because he was concerned about the effect of 
domestic violence on his daughter and about Amy’s ability to care for the child.10 
He alleged that Amy had abused drugs and alcohol and that she was not taking the 
child to school regularly.11 
This case demonstrates several factors common in custody modification cases 
involving domestic violence: the child had been exposed to severe violence, the 
degree of danger from the abusive ex-boyfriend was uncertain but seemed to be 
significant and ongoing, the living situation of the mother and child had become 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. “Battered women who are mothers are reviled.” ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, 
BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 148 (2000). 
 * J.D. Candidate 2011, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A. 2008, Kenyon 
College.  
 2. Webb v. Webb, No. M2008-02039-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3321038, at *1 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2009).  
 3. Id. 
 4. See id. This change in the custody was informal and was never approved by a court. 
See id. at *2. 
 5. See id. at *1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. The appeals court did not say whether the ex-boyfriend’s violations of the 
protective order were violent. See id. 
 10. See id. At the time of the custody hearing, Brandon was employed, while Amy was 
living on disability payments and other government assistance. Id. at *6; see also id. at *5 
(stating that father could provide the “stability” that the child needed).  
 11. Id. at *1. There had also been a report made to the Department of Child Services 
(DCS) because of bruises on the child’s back, but the DCS did not find any indication of 
abuse or neglect. Id. at *1–2. 
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unstable as a result of the domestic violence, and there were allegations that the 
mother was not a good parent. The outcome in Amy and Brandon’s case was also 
typical of these types of cases. The trial court designated Brandon as the primary 
residential parent and gave Amy only limited visitation.12 A year later, the appellate 
court upheld the decision because of the instability in Amy’s life caused by the 
“poor personal choices she has made with respect to the men she has become 
romantically involved with and whom she allows to come into contact with the 
child.”13  
Scholars and advocates for victims of domestic violence have long argued that 
courts should take seriously the harmful effects of domestic violence on children.14 
In “typical” custody cases involving domestic violence—that is, where an abused 
mother and her abusive ex-husband or ex-boyfriend are disputing the custody of 
their shared children—there is often significant bias against abused mothers, and 
courts tend to disbelieve or minimize mothers’ accounts of domestic violence.15 
Almost all states now have statutes that require or allow judges to consider 
domestic violence in making custody decisions.16 Even with these statutes in place, 
however, victims of domestic violence often face considerable difficulties in 
getting courts to take domestic violence seriously in custody disputes. 
But there is one type of private custody case, like Webb v. Webb described 
above, where courts do seem willing to view domestic violence as a significant 
threat to children: when a mother who has physical custody of her children is 
abused by a new boyfriend or husband, and the biological father of the children 
asks a court to grant him custody to prevent the children from being exposed to 
domestic violence.17 In these cases, it is the father rather than the mother who is 
asking the court to consider evidence of domestic violence, and the threat to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. Id. at *2. The trial court’s order did not include specific findings of fact. Id. at *4. 
 13. Id. 
 14. E.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic 
Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1991). 
 15. See infra Part II.B. 
 16. See Kristina C. Evans, Note, Can a Leopard Change His Spots?: Child Custody and 
Batterer’s Intervention, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 121, 125 & nn.35–36 (2004) (listing 
the state statutes and describing some variations in how they work). These statutes were 
passed in the late 1980s and the 1990s in response to what was seen as a failure of the courts 
to give appropriate weight to domestic violence in custody cases. See Cahn, supra note 14, at 
1062–71. 
 17. This Note refers to abused women (mothers) and abusive men (boyfriends and 
husbands) because nearly all of the cases discussed involve male-to-female violence. But see 
Warren v. Warren, No. 2009-CA-000979-ME, 2010 WL 135174, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 
15, 2010) (discussing, in a custody modification case, allegations that the custodial mother 
was the “aggressor” in a domestic violence incident with her boyfriend). A gendered 
depiction of domestic violence is also appropriate because most studies show that male-to-
female intimate partner violence is much more common than female-to-male. See Emily J. 
Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence 
Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1702–10. Although some studies do show that there is 
significant female-to-male intimate partner violence, these studies measure frequency of 
violence rather than context or severity. Id. Female violence is likely to be self-defensive or 
cause only minor injury, while male violence is more likely to be aggressive and severe. Id. 
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children comes from a new boyfriend or husband (and from the mother who has 
“allowed” her children to be exposed to the violence) rather than from the 
children’s biological father. As this Note demonstrates, courts in these cases 
generally seem willing to change custody to the father.  
These are difficult cases. On the one hand, it is very important for children to be 
protected from the potential physical and emotional harms associated with 
exposure to domestic violence. On the other, the change in custody will further 
disrupt a child whose life may already be chaotic. Taking custody away from an 
abused mother seems to penalize her for being the victim of domestic violence, and 
it discourages other mothers from seeking help or reporting domestic violence for 
fear of losing custody of their children.  
This Note examines this type of custody modification case, which has not 
previously received much attention in the academic literature.18 It analyzes how 
courts approach the issues in these cases, and it argues that courts are often hostile 
toward abused women and that they lack an understanding of the dynamics of 
domestic violence. It then argues that this bias against abused mothers is harmful to 
individual mothers and children involved in cases and to victims of domestic 
violence generally. This Note does not argue that mothers should always retain 
custody in these situations, but rather that the cases show courts’ bias against them. 
Part I discusses background information on the standards courts use to make 
custody decisions. Part II describes the effects that witnessing domestic violence 
can have on children and discusses how courts generally approach custody 
decisions involving domestic violence. It argues that abused mothers are often at a 
disadvantage in custody cases because of the biases of the courts and because of the 
challenges that result from domestic violence. Part III examines how these biases 
affect a narrow category of custody cases: fathers’ requests for custody 
modification because of domestic violence perpetrated against the mother by her 
new boyfriend or husband. Part IV discusses whether bias against abused mothers 
should be considered in making custody modification decisions. It argues that a less 
biased approach will reduce unnecessary transfers of custody and reduce the 
disincentive for mothers to seek help for domestic violence. Finally, Part V 
discusses cases in which courts have not granted fathers’ requests for custody 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. The most extensive discussion of this type of case appears in Leslie Joan Harris, 
Failure to Protect from Exposure to Domestic Violence in Private Custody Contests, 44 
FAM. L.Q. 169 (2010). Professor Harris describes cases in which courts have transferred 
custody to the father because of the child’s exposure to domestic violence while in the 
mother’s care, and she compares these private custody cases to failure-to-protect cases 
brought by child protection systems. See id. at 178–86. Professor Harris suggests legislative 
and judicial changes to improve judges’ access to evidence about the domestic violence and 
ultimately to improve outcomes for children. See id. at 192–95. 
  There is also a brief discussion of this type of case in Jennifer E. Horne, Note, The 
Brady Bunch and Other Fictions: How Courts Decide Child Custody Disputes Involving 
Remarried Parents, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2073, 2112 (1993). Ms. Horne identifies cases in which 
courts changed custody because of a stepfather’s violence toward the mother, and she 
concludes that these types of modification decisions are not likely to be affected by judges’ 
gender bias. Id. However, she recognizes that “these cases are painful in that they punish 
those who are subject to abuse rather than those who are abusive.” Id. 
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modification despite the fact that the children were exposed to domestic violence 
while in their mothers’ care, and it identifies what is different about these courts’ 
approaches. 
I. STANDARDS FOR INITIAL CHILD CUSTODY DECISIONS AND  
CUSTODY MODIFICATIONS 
Today, every state uses some type of “best interests of the child” standard to 
make initial child custody decisions upon the divorce or separation of the parents.19 
This standard instructs judges to do a case-by-case analysis of the best interests of 
the children involved, with no presumption in favor of either mothers or fathers.20 
Most states lay out factors that judges may or must consider, such as the child’s 
relationship with each parent; the parents’ and child’s wishes; the child’s 
adjustment to home, school, and community; the mental and physical health of all 
individuals involved; and evidence of domestic or family violence.21 The purpose 
of these lists of factors is to make judges’ custody decisions more specific and 
predictable.22 But because most states’ statutes do not instruct judges on how much 
weight to give each factor, judges have significant discretion in making custody 
decisions, and it is often difficult to predict what a judge will do in a particular 
case.23  
After the initial custody determination has been made, courts can modify the 
arrangement, but they are generally hesitant to do so because of the importance of 
maintaining stability and continuity in the child’s life.24 Most states require trial 
courts to find (1) that there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the 
original custody determination and (2) that the modification of custody is in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, NAOMI R. CAHN, CATHERINE J. ROSS & DAVID D. MEYER, 
CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 685–86 (2d ed. 2006); MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG 
WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 152–59 (2005). This Note uses the term “custody” for uniformity 
and clarity, but some states have moved away from this term. Tennessee, for example, uses 
the term “primary residential parent” rather than “custodial parent.” See, e.g., Webb v. 
Webb, No. M2008-02039-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3321038, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 
2009). Indiana uses the term “parenting time” rather than “visitation.” INDIANA PARENTING 
TIME GUIDELINES, INDIANA RULES OF COURT, available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/ 
parenting/index.html.  
 20. See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 686. 
 21. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 19, at 152; see, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8 
(West 2008). 
 22. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st Century: How the American 
Law Institute Proposes to Achieve Predictability and Still Protect the Individual Child’s Best 
Interests, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 467, 472 (1999). 
 23. See id. at 472–73 (describing the weaknesses of a “factors” approach). 
 24. See ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 837; Michael G. Ruppert, Joseph W. Ruppert 
& Joni L. Sedberry, Recent Developments: Indiana Family Law, 41 IND. L. REV. 1021, 1045 
(2008) (citing In re Marriage of Kenda, 873 N.E.2d 729, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). 
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best interests of the child.25 At the second step, the court will engage in a best 
interests evaluation using the statutory factors described above.26 
Most states require that the change in circumstances be a change in the custodial 
parent’s circumstances, “not on improvements in the non-custodial parent’s 
circumstances that might have supported that parent’s initial custody claim.”27 A 
few states allow modification based solely on the best interests of the child and do 
not require a substantial change in circumstances,28 and states also vary about how 
significant the change has to be.29 But in general, courts are reluctant to change 
custody arrangements, and appellate courts are likely to defer to the trial courts’ 
decisions about whether a change in circumstances has occurred and whether 
modification of custody is in the best interests of the child.30 
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND INITIAL CUSTODY DECISIONS 
A. The Effects on Children of Witnessing Domestic Violence 
There has been extensive research on the harmful effects on children of 
witnessing domestic violence or living in a home where there is domestic 
violence.31 While researchers and experts agree that there are many potential 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-21 (West 2008); see ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 19, 
at 837.  
 26. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
 27. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 19, at 838. For example, a noncustodial parent’s 
recovery from mental illness is usually not enough to justify modification of custody, even 
though he or she would likely have had a better chance of gaining custody if he or she had 
been healthy at the time of the initial custody decision. Id. 
 28. Id. These states include Georgia, Kansas, and New Hampshire. Id.  
 29. In Ohio, for example, the change “need not be a substantial one, but must be more 
than a slight or inconsequential change.” McClay v. Reed, No. 2004CA-4, 2004 WL 
3563008, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2004) (citing Davis v. Flickinger, 674 N.E.2d 1159, 
1162 (Ohio 1997)). In contrast, Indiana requires the change in circumstances to be “so 
decisive in nature as to make a change in custody necessary for the welfare of the child.” In 
re Paternity of Winkler, 725 N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). In Tennessee, courts 
must consider “(1) whether the change occurred after the entry of the order sought to be 
modified; (2) whether the change was known or reasonably anticipated when the order was 
entered; and (3) whether the change is one that affects the child’s well-being in a meaningful 
way.” Webb v. Webb, No. M2008-02039-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3321038, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Oct. 14, 2009) (citing Cranston v. Combs, 106 S.W.3d 641, 644 (Tenn. 2003)).  
 30. See, e.g., Walker v. Nelson, 911 N.E.2d 124, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“Judgments 
in custody matters generally turn on essential factual determinations and will be set aside 
only when they are clearly erroneous. We will not substitute our own judgment if any 
evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court’s judgment.” (citation omitted)). 
 31. Abigail H. Gewirtz & Jeffrey L. Edleson, Young Children’s Exposure to Intimate 
Partner Violence: Towards a Developmental Risk and Resilience Framework for Research 
and Intervention, 22 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 151, 155 (2007) (“Almost one hundred published 
studies report associations between exposure to intimate partner violence and current child 
problems or later adult problems.”). 
  In a significant number of families where there is domestic violence, there is also 
child abuse or maltreatment. See id. (summarizing studies that have found high co-
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negative effects on children, there is little agreement about the frequency and 
permanence of these harms.  
Parents in abusive relationships often try to protect children from witnessing the 
abuse, but most children in violent families do witness either the abuse or its 
effects, such as mothers’ injuries.32 Even when parents believe that they have 
successfully shielded their children from exposure to the abuse, children are often 
able to give “detailed descriptions about the pattern of escalating violence.”33  
Children who witness domestic violence may experience a number of negative 
psychological effects. Young children may suffer nightmares and sleep 
disturbances, as well as insecurity, fear of being abandoned, and “excessive 
clinging to adults.”34 Children of all ages also exhibit more internalizing behavior 
(anxiety, depression, and withdrawal) and externalizing behavior (aggression and 
destruction) than their peers who are not exposed to domestic violence.35 They may 
develop post-traumatic stress disorder,36 and they may suffer negative impacts on 
their cognitive and academic development.37  
Exposure to domestic violence can cause children to feel responsible for the 
violence or to feel that they have to protect their mothers or siblings.38 Teenagers 
may cope with the stress by using drugs or alcohol, and they often become involved 
in abusive dating relationships themselves.39 Teenage boys who have been exposed 
to domestic violence are more likely to become abusers, and girls are “less likely to 
question violence” in their dating relationships.40 
                                                                                                                 
occurrence of child abuse and adult domestic violence); Jeffrey L. Edleson, The Overlap 
Between Child Maltreatment and Woman Battering, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 134, 136 
(1999). This Note only discusses cases in which there are allegations of domestic violence 
and not child abuse. Child abuse cases often involve state agencies like Child Protective 
Services, and so they raise a range of practical and legal issues that are beyond the scope of 
this Note.  
 32. N. Zoe Hilton, Battered Women’s Concerns About Their Children Witnessing Wife 
Assault, 7 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 77, 80, 83 (1992). 
 33. Stephen E. Doyne, Janet M. Bowermaster, J. Reid Meloy, Donald Dutton, Peter 
Jaffe, Stephen Temko & Paul Mones, Custody Disputes Involving Domestic Violence: 
Making Children’s Needs a Priority, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Spring 1999, at 1, 3.  
 34. Id. at 4. 
 35. See Patricia Van Horn & Betsy McAlister Groves, Children Exposed to Domestic 
Violence: Making Trauma-Informed Custody and Visitation Decisions, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., 
Winter 2006, at 51, 52 (summarizing the literature on the effects on children of witnessing 
domestic violence). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Allison C. Morrill, Jianyu Dai, Samantha Dunn, Iyue Sung & Kevin Smith, 
Child Custody and Visitation Decisions When the Father Has Perpetrated Violence Against 
the Mother, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1076, 1077 (2005); Van Horn et al., supra note 
35, at 52–53. 
 38. Doyne et al., supra note 33, at 4; see McClay v. Reed, No. 2004CA-4, 2004 WL 
3563008, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2004) (describing a counselor’s testimony in a 
custody modification case that the child who witnessed domestic violence “does not see her 
mother as a protector, but rather sees herself as the protector of her baby sister Ashley”). 
 39. Doyne et al., supra note 33, at 4.  
 40. Id. 
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Children may also be physically injured as a result of domestic violence against 
their mother. In one recent survey of abused mothers, “[o]ver a third reported their 
children were accidentally injured during an incident of adult domestic violence, 
and over a quarter reported the abusive partner intentionally injured their children 
when the child intervened to stop abuse of their mother.”41 
Despite the very serious potential for negative effects on children, not all 
children are affected the same way, and some may not be greatly affected or may 
be able to recover quickly.42 A study of children living with their mothers in 
domestic violence shelters found that different children react differently to 
exposure to domestic violence: 
In contrast to prior research suggesting that children exposed to 
domestic violence exhibit increased levels of virtually all kinds of 
behavioral and emotional problems, our cluster analysis indicated that 
close to one third (30%) of children developed both internalizing and 
externalizing problems and that a similar number (31%) did not exhibit 
any signs of maladjustment. Others demonstrated only externalizing 
(21%) or only internalizing (18%) problems.43 
Similarly, another study of children living in a domestic violence shelter found that 
about 60% of the children were “not distressed” or “very mildly distressed,” 
meaning that they had low or average numbers of behavioral problems, no anxiety 
or mild anxiety, and average or high levels of self-esteem.44 The other 40% of the 
children did develop more severe problems.45 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. Lyungai F. Mbilinyi, Jeffrey L. Edleson, Annelies K. Hagemeister & Sandra K. 
Beeman, What Happens to Children When Their Mothers Are Battered? Reports from a 
Four City Anonymous Telephone Survey, 22 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 309, 315 (2007). 
 42. See Cris M. Sullivan, Jennifer Juras, Deborah Bybee, Huong Nguyen & Nicole 
Allen, How Children’s Adjustment Is Affected by Their Relationships to Their Mothers’ 
Abusers, 15 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 587, 589 (2000). 
 43. See John H. Grych, Ernest N. Jouriles, Paul R. Swank, Renee McDonald & William 
D. Norwood, Patterns of Adjustment Among Children of Battered Women, 68 J. CONSULTING 
& CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 84, 91 (2000). 
 44. Honore M. Hughes & Douglas A. Luke, Heterogeneity in Adjustment Among 
Children of Battered Women, in CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL VIOLENCE: THEORY, 
RESEARCH, AND APPLIED ISSUES 185, 198–99, 205 (George W. Holden, Robert Geffner & 
Ernest N. Jouriles, eds. 1998). 
 45. Id. at 205. A few studies have found virtually no differences between children who 
are exposed to domestic violence and their peers from nonviolent homes in terms of 
depression, behavioral problems, and social competence. See Sullivan et al., supra note 42, 
at 588–89 (summarizing the literature) (“[The data] raise the issue that a significant 
proportion of the children in question do not seem to be clinically depressed or acting out, 
and that some children appear to be more resilient than others following exposure to 
domestic violence.”). For example, a study of children whose mothers had been battered in 
the previous four months found that the children’s average score on a self-competency scale 
was within the normal range. Id. at 598–99, 590–91. This study aimed to test whether the 
identity of the abuser (biological father, stepfather, or non-father-figure) affected the degree 
of impact on children. Id. at 589. It found that children who were exposed to violence 
perpetrated by their biological fathers had lower self-competency scores as compared to 
children who were exposed to violence by their stepfathers or non-father-figures. Id. at 598–
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These studies show that some children do not suffer severe, long-term effects 
from their exposure to domestic violence. One expert described this surprising 
result: “[O]ne of the most dramatic experiences that advocates in the domestic 
violence movement have had is watching [children’s] problems that seem to be 
quite profound and clinically significant abate after a relatively short period of 
safety . . . and security was provided.”46  
B. Initial Custody Decisions Involving Domestic Violence 
This subpart discusses how custody decisions are made in the typical custody 
case involving domestic violence, that is, when an abused mother and her abusive 
ex-husband or ex-boyfriend are disputing the custody of their shared children. 
Scholars and advocates have documented the difficulties and biases that abused 
mothers face in these types of custody cases.47 This subpart provides an overview 
of these issues as a basis for comparison to the cases that are the main focus of this 
Note: requests for custody modifications because of the custodial mother’s abusive 
relationship with a new intimate partner. 
1. Frequency of Domestic Violence in Custody Cases 
A surprisingly high number of litigated custody cases involve domestic 
violence. According to studies cited by the American Bar Association, 25% to 50% 
of “disputed custody cases involve domestic violence.”48 Other studies have placed 
the rate somewhere between 11% and 15%.49 
                                                                                                                 
99. However, the average scores of all groups were within the normal range on a self-
competency scale. Id. 
 46. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (third alteration 
in original) (quoting testimony of expert Evan Stark). Nicholson is a recent high-profile case 
that examined at length the question of the impact on children of exposure to domestic 
violence. In Nicholson, abused mothers challenged New York’s practice of prosecuting 
mothers and putting their children in foster care because of the mothers’ “failure to protect” 
the children from exposure to domestic violence. Id. at 163–64. Although it raised similar 
issues, Nicholson is different from the custody modification cases that are the focus of this 
Note because Nicholson dealt with state action rather than private custody disputes. 
 47. This subpart only discusses biases that affect abused mothers when they contest custody in 
court, because the focus of this Note is on custody modification cases that are decided by courts. 
But it is important to note that abused mothers are disadvantaged in all aspects of the custody 
process, including those outside the courtroom. For example, an abuser may use the mediation 
process to emotionally and physically intimidate his ex-spouse. Clare Dalton, Susan Carbon & 
Nancy Olesen, High Conflict Divorce, Violence, and Abuse: Implications for Custody and 
Visitation Decisions, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Fall 2003, at 11, 21–22. An abused mother might also 
agree to a reduced financial settlement in exchange for custody of her children. See SCHNEIDER, 
supra note 1, at 168–69; Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 133, 191 (1992).  
 48. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 10 MYTHS ABOUT CUSTODY AND 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND HOW TO COUNTER THEM (2006) [hereinafter ABA, 10 MYTHS], 
available at http://www.abanet.org/domviol/custody_myths.pdf (citing SUSAN L. KEILITZ, 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES: 
A RESOURCE HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 4–8 (1997), and Janet R. 
Johnston, High-Conflict Divorce, FUTURE OF CHILD., Spring 1994, at 165). 
 49. See Mary A. Kernic, Daphne J. Monary-Ernsdorff, Jennifer K. Koepsell & Victoria 
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Because of the potential harm to children from domestic violence, described in 
Part II.A, a straightforward consideration of the best interests of the child would 
suggest that courts would try to keep children away from their abusive fathers.50 
But in fact, a history of abuse does not appear to affect abusive fathers’ ability to 
get custody in disputed custody cases.51 A study of custody disputes in Seattle, 
Washington, showed that allegations of male-to-female domestic violence did not 
affect the rate at which mothers and fathers were awarded custody, as compared to 
cases where there were no allegations of domestic violence.52  
2. Courts Tend Not to Consider or Believe Abused Mothers’ Testimony  
About Domestic Violence 
Abused mothers face a number of difficulties in getting judges to acknowledge 
domestic violence and to believe that it has occurred. This subpart summarizes 
some of these difficulties, including problems getting evidence of domestic 
violence into the record, the perception of abused mothers as overdramatic or 
hysterical, and judges’ frustrations with parents whom they believe to be overly 
litigious and uncooperative. 
Sometimes, evidence of the violence is never entered into the record. One study 
of custody disputes in Seattle, Washington, evaluated the divorce and custody case 
files of couples who had histories of “police- or court-reported” intimate partner 
violence (meaning that official records that supported the allegations of violence 
were easily available).53 Almost half of these case files did not mention domestic 
violence at all, and an additional 28.9% included unsubstantiated allegations of 
domestic violence but did not include the police or court records that would have 
provided support for the allegations.54 Keep in mind that this study focused on 
cases where there were official records of domestic violence; in many cases, there 
is no “verifiable evidence” and abused mothers can only offer their own testimony 
of what happened.55 
                                                                                                                 
L. Holt, Children in the Crossfire: Child Custody Determinations Among Couples with a 
History of Intimate Partner Violence, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 991, 992 (2005) 
(summarizing literature that suggests that more than 150,000 of the one million children who 
are subject to custody determinations each year live in homes with domestic violence); id. at 
1005, 1013 (finding that 11.4% of divorce and custody proceedings in Seattle, Washington 
in 1998–1999 involved domestic violence, and extrapolating this rate to the whole United 
States). 
 50. See ABA, 10 MYTHS, supra note 48 (listing the belief that “[a]busive fathers don’t 
get custody” as one of ten myths about custody and domestic violence). 
 51. An ABA publication even argues that abusive fathers are more likely than 
nonviolent fathers to seek and get sole custody. ABA, 10 MYTHS, supra note 48. 
 52. Kernic et al., supra note 49, at 1006. The authors of the study noted that all women, 
whether or not they were victims of intimate partner violence, were much more likely than 
men to get custody of their children, which could affect the authors’ “ability to detect group 
differences.” Id. at 1014.  
 53. Kernic et al., supra note 49, at 999–1001. 
 54. Id. at 1005, 1013. 
 55. Dana Harrington Conner, Abuse and Discretion: Evaluating Judicial Discretion in 
Custody Cases Involving Violence Against Women, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
163, 183–84 (2009). 
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Factors that contribute to the absence of consideration of domestic violence in 
custody cases include “inadequate screening for [intimate partner violence] by 
family courts”56 and the “lack of coordination of domestic violence services across 
different courts and the consequent failure to apply findings of [intimate partner 
violence] from other courts to the custody proceedings.”57 Women are often 
reluctant to tell attorneys, judges, or other officials about domestic violence 
because of shame, fear of retaliation from the abuser, or a belief that abuse is 
normal or acceptable.58 Abused women also “tend to minimize and deny abuse 
while understating the amount and severity of abuse.”59 Finally, many parties in 
custody and divorce cases proceed pro se, which means that abused mothers are 
themselves responsible for making the court aware of histories of domestic 
violence and producing evidence to support the allegations.60  
Despite the prevalence of domestic violence, particularly in child custody 
disputes,61 and despite the tendency of abused women to deny or minimize the 
abuse,62 judges tend to doubt women’s testimony and to expect it to be 
exaggerated.63 This unwillingness to believe abused mothers may result in part 
from general bias against female witnesses since “judges and other key players in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. Kernic et al., supra note 49, at 1013–14 (citing Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in 
Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary Traumatic Stress and the Need for 
Compassionate Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 567 (2003), and Peter G. 
Jaffe & Robert Geffner, Child Custody Disputes and Domestic Violence: Critical Issues for 
Mental Health, Social Service, and Legal Professionals, in CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL 
VIOLENCE: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND APPLIED ISSUES 371 (George W. Holden, Robert 
Geffner & Ernest N. Jouriles, eds. 1998)). 
 57. Id. at 1014 (citing LOUIS W. MCHARDY & MEREDITH HOFFORD, NATIONAL COUNCIL 
OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FINAL REPORT OF THE CHILD CUSTODY AND 
VISITATION FOCUS GROUP (1999), and Kim Susser, Weighing the Domestic Violence Factor 
in Custody Cases: Tipping the Scales in Favor of Protecting Victims and Their Children, 27 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 875 (2000)). 
 58. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 104–08; FINAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA 
SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON RACIAL AND GENDER BIAS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 397 
(2003) [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA REPORT] (“To maintain her safety, a survivor may at first 
feel compelled to withhold information, or may blame herself, thereby accepting the abuser’s 
distorted version of events.”). 
 59. Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: 
Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 657, 684 (2003). 
 60. See Kernic et al., supra note 49, at 1014; cf. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 58, 
at 394 (describing the difficulties faced by domestic violence victims who represent 
themselves at protective order hearings). 
 61. See supra notes 48−52 and accompanying text. 
 62. Meier, supra note 59, at 684. 
 63. Interestingly, judges seem to be willing to believe allegations of domestic violence 
in other contexts, such as protective order hearings. Meier, supra note 59, at 667–71. 
Extensive activism and efforts at judicial education have made it possible to successfully 
allege domestic violence in some types of cases (which was often impossible as recently as 
the 1980s), but once children are involved, judges become much more reluctant to believe 
victims. Id. at 667–71, 686. 
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our legal system generally view women as less credible than men.”64 Abused 
women are at a particular disadvantage because of judges’ lack of knowledge about 
patterns of domestic violence and their tendency to interpret victim’s stories as 
irrational or overdramatic: 
[W]hen exaggeration is at issue there is a good probability that the 
person suspected of offering the offending testimony is a woman. . . .  
 The victim’s story may seem to defy logic. Without a great 
understanding of the dynamics of intimate partner violence, a judge 
may question the ability of an individual to tolerate such severe acts of 
violence for so long. As a result, the judge may question the actual 
level of violence or the victim’s motives if she remained in the abusive 
relationship for an extended period of time.65  
Many abused women do not appear credible in court because they are “angry or 
emotional” and may be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, which can 
cause them “to over-react to ostensibly trivial issues, to display a strange lack of 
affect when discussing the violence, or to giggle inappropriately.”66 Abusers, on the 
other hand, are often calm, charming, and believable in court.67 Abusers are often 
able to convince themselves and others that they have done nothing wrong and that 
their intimate partner is the one who is somehow at fault.68  
One survey of abused women and victim advocates found that abused mothers 
were treated as “hysterical and unreasonable” in their interactions with judges, 
family services officials, and guardians ad litem.69 Feminist writers have argued 
that abused women are characterized as dysfunctional, weak, or crazy, and 
therefore unable to take care of their children: “[The stereotype of battered women] 
blames women for not leaving, instead of men for perpetrating the abuse; it also 
characterizes ‘batteredness’ as deviant, abnormal, and different from what ‘normal’ 
women experience.”70  
Finally, judges tend to see abusive relationships as “messes” or “disasters” with 
both sides contributing to the arguments and violence, even when one parent is 
clearly the aggressor.71 In an extreme example from a custody case, a judge 
chastised both parties for assaulting each other; the father had broken into the 
mother’s home and stabbed her, and the mother hit him with a vase in self-
defense.72 When there are allegations of violence by both parties, even when one 
party is more aggressive and dangerous, judges tend to “neutralize” the allegations 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. Conner, supra note 55, at 176. 
 65. Id. at 176–77 (citations omitted). 
 66. Meier, supra note 59, at 691–92 (citation omitted). 
 67. Id. at 690–91. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 672 (quoting Kristen Lombardi, Custodians of Abuse, BOS. PHOENIX, Jan. 9, 
2003) (citing BATTERED MOTHERS’ TESTIMONY PROJECT, WELLESLEY CTRS. FOR WOMEN, 
BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT: A HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND 
CHILD CUSTODY IN THE MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY COURTS (2002)). 
 70. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 170. 
 71. See Meier, supra note 59, at 692–93. 
 72. Id. at 693 (describing a custody case from Professor Meier’s own practice). 
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and treat the parties as having equal blame and equal standing to get custody of the 
child.73  
All of these factors tend to make judges disbelieve or minimize allegations of 
domestic violence, which is compounded by the fact that these allegations are 
presented in the adversarial setting of custody disputes.74 Both parents are litigants 
who have motivation to lie or exaggerate about the other party because one will 
win and the other will lose, and the stakes of who will get custody of the children 
are very high. When the father tells a “reasonable” story about the mother’s 
vindictiveness and instability, and the mother has a strange affect and tells an 
“unreasonable” story about extreme abuse, the judge is more likely to believe that 
the mother is lying or exaggerating. 
3. Effect of Domestic Violence on Mothers’ Economic and Emotional Stability 
It is very difficult to leave a relationship involving domestic violence. The 
period of separation is one of the most dangerous times in a violent relationship for 
the victim, and there is a high risk of severe abuse when a woman announces her 
intention to leave or actually does leave.75 Leaving a violent relationship also 
throws many women into financial instability, and they may have to live in 
domestic violence shelters or in a series of temporary homes for a time after the 
separation.76 Unfortunately, women’s efforts to end violent relationships are 
sometimes interpreted by the courts as indicating parental instability; for example, 
a woman who moves into temporary housing may be found to have disrupted her 
child’s education or to be unable to provide safe, stable housing.77 This can hurt 
women in custody disputes: 
[D]omestic violence is itself responsible for many of the conditions and 
phenomena that then are used as independent ground for assessing what 
represents children’s welfare. In this sense, not only is violence not 
addressed, but its workings also are deeply and invisibly embedded in 
how we resolve questions of children’s interests.78 
In addition, domestic violence may actually affect mothers’ ability to parent. 
Drug and alcohol abuse is common among abused women as a way of dealing with 
the violence.79 Domestic violence also causes depression, anxiety, sleep 
disturbances, emotional numbing, and other mental disorders, which may interfere 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. Id. at 692–93. 
 74. See id. at 684–86. 
 75. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 64–65 (1991). 
 76. See Jennifer L. Woolard & Sarah L. Cook, Common Goals, Competing Interests: 
Preventing Violence Against Spouses and Children, 69 UMKC L. REV. 197, 212 (2000). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Martha McMahon & Ellen Pence, Doing More Harm than Good? Some Cautions on 
Visitation Centers, in ENDING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO 
CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN 186, 201 (Einat Peled, Peter G. Jaffe & Jeffrey L. Edleson 
eds., 1995). 
 79. See Meier, supra note 59, at 696–97. 
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with parenting abilities.80 If the court that is deciding the custody case looks only at 
the parents’ current ability to control and nurture the children, mothers who have 
been severely affected by domestic violence may appear to be less capable parents 
than the abusers.81 A narrowly focused consideration of parenting skills fails to take 
into account why the mother is depressed or traumatized, or that her “craziness” 
may be the result of the violence.82  
III. CUSTODY MODIFICATION WHEN THE MOTHER IS ABUSED BY A  
NEW INTIMATE PARTNER 
Given the difficulties that abused mothers have getting courts to believe and act 
on their allegations of domestic violence, it is surprising to find a category of cases 
in which courts do take domestic violence seriously: cases where a father asks the 
court to modify custody because of domestic violence perpetrated against the 
mother by her new intimate partner. In these cases, courts appear to take to heart 
the arguments made by advocates about the harmful effects of domestic violence on 
children.83 It would seem to be encouraging that courts are taking domestic 
violence seriously and recognizing the actual and potential harms for children in 
violent households.84 The results in these cases are “consistent with the general 
view that living with domestic violence is both traumatic and physically dangerous 
to children,”85 and judges who make these decisions put forward compelling 
arguments about the safety of the children involved. But a troubling pattern 
emerges in these cases: women who are victims of domestic violence are losing 
custody of their children because of their victimization.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 80. See id.; Dalton et al., supra note 47, at 20.  
 81. Meier, supra note 59, at 697. 
 82. See id. 
 83. For example, in a custody modification case that centered on domestic violence 
perpetrated against the mother by her boyfriend, the Supreme Court of Alaska cited two law 
review pieces that discuss the harmful effects on children of witnessing domestic violence. 
Iverson v. Griffith, No. S-11843, 2006 WL 2578692, at *4 n.11, n.14 (Alaska Sept. 6, 2006) 
(citing Amy B. Levin, Comment, Child Witnesses of Domestic Violence: How Should Judges 
Apply the Best Interests of the Child Standard in Custody and Visitation Cases Involving 
Domestic Violence?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 813, 832–33 (2000), and Rachel L. Melissa, 
Comment, Oregon’s Response to the Impact of Domestic Violence on Children, 82 OR. L. 
REV. 1125, 1128–29 (2003)).  
 84. See, e.g., Dennis v. Dennis, 1990 WL 207392, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1990). 
In this case, a noncustodial father successfully requested sole custody of his seven-year-old 
daughter. Id. at *2, *5. The trial court stated that children can suffer harm from domestic 
violence even when they do not witness it directly: “[T]he disharmony in the home has got to 
be transmitted over to the child whether the child actually sees it or not . . . [T]he child has to 
sense the frustration that exists between the mother and a stepparent.” Id. at *5 (quoting and 
agreeing with the trial court’s decision). Another Tennessee court also recognized the 
potential for future harm to a child who was living in a home with domestic violence, even 
though a psychiatrist and a social worker found that the child had suffered no ill effects up to 
that point. Peters v. Peters, No. 02A01-9810-CH-00283, 1999 WL 285891, at *2–3, *8 
(Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 1999). 
 85. Horne, supra note 18, at 2112. 
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Feminist scholars engage in a practice of “asking the woman question” as a way 
to “identify the gender implications of rules and practices which might otherwise 
appear to be neutral or objective.”86 For example, feminists ask: What are women’s 
experiences of the “life situation” addressed in this area of law?87 What 
assumptions about gender or about experiences does the law make?88  
This Note asks the woman question by challenging the neutral explanations for 
the tendency of courts to take custody away from mothers who are abused by their 
new intimate partners. It asks why it is abused women who are generally the losers 
in these cases, and it examines how courts understand and portray these women.  
A review of the relevant cases shows how difficult they are; the violence is often 
horrific, and in some cases the threat of harm to the children is apparent. Abused 
mothers emerge as complicated and sometimes unsympathetic actors. But 
unpacking the revulsion that observers and judges sometimes feel about the 
mothers in these cases reveals important biases and assumptions. This Part focuses 
on how courts understand and react to abused mothers. 
The cases described in this Part follow the same general fact pattern: after a 
mother and father separate or divorce, the mother becomes involved in an abusive 
relationship with a new boyfriend or husband, and the father petitions the court to 
modify custody to protect the children from exposure to the violence.89 This Part 
                                                                                                                 
 
 86. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 837 (1990). 
 87. Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 64, 72–73 (1985). 
 88. Id. at 74. 
 89. I have based my analysis on thirty-nine cases from fifteen states, all following the 
same basic fact pattern. These cases are all appellate cases that appear in reporters or on 
electronic databases. I have included cases from as long as twenty years ago, but I have 
focused on more recent cases. The cases include: J.M. v. D.V., 877 So. 2d 623 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 2003); Bratton v. Romine, 819 So. 2d 58 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001); Iverson v. Griffith, 
No. S-11843, 2006 WL 2578692 (Alaska Sept. 6, 2006); Handley v. Handley, No. CA 08-
21, 2008 WL 4724105 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2008); John O. v. Margaret E., No. D054020, 
2009 WL 2564846 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2009); In re Paulson, No. CS99-03153, 2006 WL 
4555227 (Del. Fam. Ct. Sept. 15, 2006); RJ.J. v. SC., No. CN95-09779, 2004 WL 2334312 
(Del. Fam. Ct. Apr. 20, 2004); H.B. v. J.R., No. 36A01-1005-JP-255, 2010 WL 5387476 
(Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2010); Fisher v. Fisher, No. 37A03-0609-CV-415, 2007 WL 914621 
(Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2007); In re Marriage of Engle, No. 09-1055, 2010 WL 446987 
(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2010); P.C. v. S.C., No. 2008-CA-001873-ME, 2009 WL 960682 
(Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2009); T.L. v. T.M., No. 2007-CA-001877-ME, 2008 WL 4271038 
(Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2008); Snyder v. Snyder, No. 2005-CA-002074-ME, 2006 WL 
1195927 (Ky. Ct. App. May 5, 2006); Chapman v. Chapman, No. 2002-CA-001816-MR, 
2003 WL 21513513 (Ky. Ct. App. July 3, 2003); Rongstad v. Rongstad, No. C1-00-1727, 
2001 WL 1328404 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2001); Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581 
(Miss. 1999); Pruett v. Prinz, 979 So. 2d 745 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); Scott QQ v. Stephanie 
RR, 905 N.Y.S.2d 347 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); Rue v. Carpenter, 893 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2010); Martin v. Martin, 878 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); Wentland 
v. Rousseau, 875 N.Y.S.2d 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); Battista v. Fasano, 838 N.Y.S.2d 178 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2007); Drew v. Gillin, 792 N.Y.S.2d 691 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Assini v. 
Assini, 783 N.Y.S.2d 51 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Scialdo v. Kernan, 754 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2003); K.D. v. J.D., No. V-16584-03, 2004 WL 1753417 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. June 30, 
2004); Pheasant v. McKibben, 396 S.E.2d 333 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); Wartman v. 
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argues that courts (1) fail to recognize that mothers are acting in the context of 
domestic violence, (2) view abused mothers as inherently bad parents because of 
their involvement with domestic violence, (3) fail to recognize abused mothers’ 
parenting abilities, and (4) sometimes transfer custody to a noncustodial father who 
has committed domestic violence in the past. This Note argues that these tendencies 
demonstrate bias against abused mothers in this type of custody modification case.  
A. Failure to Recognize the Context of Domestic Violence 
Abused mothers’ actions can seem bizarre and irrational if they are considered 
without reference to the context of domestic violence,90 and this subpart argues that 
courts tend not to recognize the context of domestic violence when making custody 
modification decisions. Courts view mothers’ abusive relationships with new 
intimate partners as bad parenting choices, and they blame mothers for economic 
and emotional instability that was caused at least in part by the domestic violence. 
Mothers therefore end up with two strikes against them: they are victims of 
domestic violence and they are making bad parenting choices; they are victims of 
domestic violence and they have financial problems; they are victims of domestic 
violence and they are emotionally unstable. This subpart does not argue that the 
mothers in these cases should always retain custody, but rather it argues that courts 
treat abused mothers unfairly by considering the effects of domestic violence as 
independent of the context of domestic violence. 
1. Abusive Relationships as Bad Parenting Choices 
Courts sometimes view mothers’ abusive relationships with new husbands or 
boyfriends as irresponsible choices. In Fisher v. Fisher, a 2007 Indiana case, the 
trial court agreed with a custody evaluator who found that the mother was 
“currently making bad parenting decisions” in part because of her reconciliation 
with her second husband, who had been charged with domestic battery about nine 
months before the custody hearing.91 Similarly, an Alaska trial court described a 
                                                                                                                 
Livengood, No. 2009CA00284, 2010 WL 5071111 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2010); 
Sheppeard v. Brown, 2008 WL 186670 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2008); McClay v. Reed, No. 
2004CA-4, 2004 WL 3563008 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2004); Webb v. Webb, No. M2008-
02039-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3321038 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2009); In re T.C.D., 261 
S.W.3d 734 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007); McEvoy v. Brewer, No. M2001-02054-COA-R3-CV, 
2003 WL 22794521 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003); Peters v. Peters, No. 02A01-9810-CH-
00283, 1999 WL 285891 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 1999); Newport v. Newport, No. 03A01-
9712-JV-00543, 1998 WL 820765 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 1998); Bjork v. Bjork, No. 
01A01-9702-CV-00087, 1997 WL 653917 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1997); Smith v. Smith, 
No. 03A01-9508-CH-00292, 1996 WL 33177 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 1996); Dennis v. 
Dennis, 1990 WL 207392 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1990); Cobb v. Cobb, 2 P.3d 578 (Wyo. 
2000).  
 90. See supra text accompanying notes 69–70. 
 91. 2007 WL 914621, at *3 (quoting the trial court’s opinion). The court made a 
permanent modification of physical custody of the two children from the mother to the father 
because of the domestic violence between the mother and her second husband, the second 
husband’s use of marijuana and alcohol, and the mother’s failure to commit fully to 
counseling or to pursue additional education. Id.  
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child’s exposure to domestic violence perpetrated by the mother’s boyfriend as 
“poor judgment on the part of her mother.”92 
This view that mothers are making irresponsible choices by staying with their 
abusive intimate partners assumes that mothers could have (and should have) left.93 
It characterizes mothers’ actions as irrational “choices,” when in fact they may not 
have been irrational, or they may not have been choices at all. Although the cases 
seldom provide details about the financial situations of the mothers, we do know 
that the mother in Fisher was not fully employed at the time of the custody 
hearing.94 She had also been prevented by a previous court order from moving with 
her children to a different county to be closer to her mother and pursue a career as a 
dental hygienist.95 Perhaps this mother was struggling financially and had few 
options for herself and her children other than staying with her abusive second 
husband. But the custody evaluator’s opinion (and the trial court’s endorsement of 
it) characterizes her reconciliation with her second husband as an irresponsible and 
irrational choice. When a mother’s actions are framed as simply poor parenting 
choices, without consideration of the difficulties and pressures that domestic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. Iverson, 2006 WL 2578692, at *3 (quoting the trial court’s opinion).  
  Another recent example of this “poor decision making” language comes from H.B. 
v. J.R., an Indiana case: “There is no question in the Court’s mind that [the mother] loves her 
children. However, the evidence has raised substantial and legitimate questions about her 
judgment in exposing her children to an unstable environment where domestic violence has 
occurred and where ongoing risks of domestic violence exist.” 2010 WL 5387476, at *2 
(quoting and affirming the trial court’s order). In this case, the evidence of domestic violence 
came from the protective order the mother had obtained against an ex-boyfriend because of 
his physical violence and threats. Id. at *1–2.  
  In other cases, a court’s characterization of a mother’s action as a “decision” strains 
credulity. In Scialdo v. Kernan, 754 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003), the mother called 
the police multiple times because of her third husband’s violence: 
In another example of poor decision-making, after having her most recent 
former husband removed from the home for domestic violence that was 
witnessed by [her son] and required police intervention, she allowed him back 
into the home two days later only to have him arrested for a second incident of 
domestic violence, again witnessed by her son. 
Id. at 408. This description of the violence puts the blame squarely on the mother for her 
“decision” to allow her former husband to enter the home and commit violence so severe 
that it required police intervention. But this version of events doesn’t make much sense; 
although we do not have any facts beyond what the court has provided, it seems unlikely that 
the mother had much of a choice about allowing her former husband into the home or that 
she had any control over what he did once he was there. Despite the court’s apparent bias 
against the mother, however, there was substantial evidence that supported the court’s 
decision, including evidence of the mother’s drug and alcohol abuse and lack of supervision 
of the child. See id.  
 93. See Mahoney, supra note 75, at 61 (“The ‘shopworn question’ [of ‘why didn’t she 
leave?’] persists in the cases, legal scholarship, and social science literature. It reveals 
several assumptions about separation: that the right solution is separation, that it is the 
woman’s responsibility to achieve separation, and that she could have separated.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 94. 2007 WL 914621, at *3. 
 95. Id. at *1. 
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violence creates, it is easier for courts to view them as dysfunctional, bad parents 
who should not be trusted with custody of their children. 
Another example of the “choice” language appeared in Webb v. Webb, the case 
that introduced this Note. The court blamed the mother for the choices she had 
made that led to instability in her life: 
The child is now entering kindergarten requiring a more stable home 
life in order to attend school and establish relationships with her 
classmates. Moreover, while the child’s life requires more stability, 
Mother’s life has become increasingly less stable due to poor personal 
choices she has made with respect to the men she has become 
romantically involved with and whom she allows to come into contact 
with the child.96 
Although most of the instability in the mother’s life—such as moving into a shelter 
and then moving in with a friend—resulted from domestic violence, the court 
portrayed the instability as the result of the mother’s poor choices.97 
2. Mothers’ Financial and Housing Problems After Leaving an  
Abusive Relationship 
As described above,98 the period immediately after leaving an abusive 
relationship can be extremely dangerous and unstable. Abused mothers may need 
to move with their children to a domestic violence shelter or to a series of friends’ 
or relatives’ houses, and courts sometimes fault mothers for this instability.99 
Courts may also fault abused mothers for their failure to retain steady employment 
in the aftermath of leaving abusive relationships.100 In P.C. v. S.C., the custodial 
mother had ended her relationships with two abusive boyfriends, but she and her 
child “had lived at various times in hotels and domestic violence shelters.”101 At the 
time of the custody hearing, the house she was renting had been foreclosed upon, 
and she was having trouble paying for utilities.102 The trial court transferred 
custody of the child to the father, finding that the mother “had not maintained 
steady employment . . . had lived in numerous places and often failed to provide 
[the child] with a suitable home.”103 At least some of the mother’s financial and 
housing-related instability resulted from trying to leave violent relationships, but 
neither the trial court nor the appellate court acknowledged this connection.104 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. Webb v. Webb, No. M2008-02039-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3321038, at *4 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2009).  
 97. See id. at *1. 
 98. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 99. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
 100. Cf. supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
 101. No. 2008-CA-001873-ME, 2009 WL 960682, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2009). 
 102. Id. at *3. 
 103. Id. at *1. 
 104. See id. at *3.  
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3. Emotional Problems Created by Domestic Violence 
Domestic violence can also cause mothers to suffer emotional problems and to 
turn to drugs and alcohol.105 In one sad case, the mother claimed to have been 
abused by the father during their marriage (although the court only mentioned and 
did not discuss this allegation), and she was also abused by her second husband.106 
She was initially awarded custody of the two children, but because of a nervous 
breakdown, alcohol and prescription drug abuse, and a stay at a mental health 
hospital, the court awarded emergency and then permanent custody of the children 
to the father.107 The mother’s mother told the court that she believed that her 
daughter’s problems “resulted from her being a victim of domestic violence.”108 
Although the facts (as presented by the appellate court) suggest that the mother 
may not have been able to be a good parent to her children at the time of the 
custody modification, it is problematic that the court did not seem to recognize any 
connection between the mother’s history of being the victim of domestic violence 
and her substance abuse and mental health problems. Like the mothers who were 
faulted both for being in abusive relationships and moving to new housing to get 
out of them, this mother’s history of abusive relationships, substance abuse 
problems, and mental health problems were treated as independent factors used to 
show that it was not in the best interests of the children for her to have custody. 
B. Abused Mothers as Inherently Bad Parents 
In custody modification cases, courts tend to view mothers who have been the 
victims of domestic violence as inherently bad mothers. This is demonstrated by 
cases in which courts discuss the mother’s history of abusive relationships as a 
“personality trait,” as well as cases in which courts transfer custody after the 
abusive relationship is over. 
1. Abusive Relationships as a Personality Trait 
As in other custody cases involving domestic violence, courts making custody 
modification decisions often view the mother as “dysfunctional.”109 In Rongstad v. 
Rongstad, a court changed custody from the mother to the father in part because the 
mother “[had] developed the personality trait of seeking out relationships with 
abusive individuals, thereby exposing her children to danger.”110 In Handley v. 
Handley, a mother who had been involved in incidents of domestic violence with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
 106. See In re Paulson, No. CS99-03153, 2006 WL 4555227, at *2, *6 (Del. Fam. Ct. 
Sept. 15, 2006). 
 107. Id. at *1–2. 
 108. Id. at *6. 
 109. See Mahoney, supra note 75, at 46; see also supra notes 66–70 and accompanying 
text. Mahoney argues that cultural images of battered women as helpless and dysfunctional 
“may be interpreted as making [a battered woman] a poor model in childrearing and possibly 
a poor caregiver as well when custody is in question.” Mahoney, supra note 75, at 49. 
 110. No. C1-00-1727, 2001 WL 1328404, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2001). 
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her second husband was lectured by the trial judge, “If nothing else, you’re overly 
dramatic and you’re overly histrionic, and it gets to a level of danger for you and 
for your children.”111 When battered women are pathologized in this way, it makes 
it easier for courts to view them as bad, incompetent mothers.112 
2. Modifying Custody Even After the Abusive Relationship Is Over 
Courts seem willing to transfer custody from an abused mother to the father 
even after the abusive relationship is over. In Assini v. Assini, the mother filed the 
complaint that led to her abusive boyfriend’s arrest, obtained an order of protection 
against him, and apparently ended the relationship.113 Nonetheless, the trial court 
granted temporary custody to the father because the fact that the abusive boyfriend 
“was no longer residing with [the mother] because she had obtained an order of 
protection against him, did not overcome the detrimental effect of allowing the 
child to be subject to such repeated instances of domestic violence.”114 Similarly, a 
Tennessee appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of custody modification 
because of the mother’s history of violent relationships, despite the fact that the 
court apparently believed that her current marriage was fairly stable, with no 
violent incidents for about a year and a half.115 These cases, in which courts order 
custody modification at least in part because of previous abusive relationships that 
no longer threaten to harm the children, seem to show that courts view abused 
mothers as inherently incapable parents who will never achieve stability or good 
parenting.116 Again, courts seem to view the abusive relationships as the mother’s 
fault. 
C. Failure to Recognize Mothers’ Parenting Abilities 
Courts are quick to point out children’s academic and social difficulties as 
support for modifying custody,117 and it is true that exposure to domestic violence 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. No. CA 08-21, 2008 WL 4724105, at *4 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2008). This case 
involved three incidents where both the mother and her second husband were violent. Id. at 
*1–2. In all three, the mother claimed that she acted in self-defense in response to her second 
husband’s violence. Id. at *3. 
 112. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 149. 
 113. 783 N.Y.S.2d 51, 53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). This case involved a temporary 
custody determination rather than a final one, but the same best interests of the child 
standard applied. Id.  
 114. Id. at 52–53. 
 115. Peters v. Peters, No. 02A01-9810-CH-00283, 1999 WL 285891, at *2, *8 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. May 10, 1999). After divorcing the father, the mother had had two violent marriages 
that ended in divorce. Id. at *1. She and her current husband had been involved in one 
incident of domestic violence while they were dating, which resulted in both being charged 
with aggravated assault. Id. at *2. There had been no incidents of domestic violence since 
then, and the trial court described them as appearing “to be doing very well.” Id. at *3.  
 116. See also P.C. v. S.C., No. 2008-CA-001873-ME, 2009 WL 960682, at *2–3 (Ky. Ct. 
App. Apr. 10, 2009) (changing custody to the father in part because of the mother’s two 
abusive relationships, even though she had terminated the relationships).  
 117. See, e.g., Dennis v. Dennis, 1990 WL 207392, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1990) 
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can cause problems with children’s academic and cognitive development.118 But 
courts fail to credit abused mothers when their children are found to be doing well 
despite the domestic violence. In Peters v. Peters, a psychiatrist found that Brianna, 
a child whose custodial mother had been involved in three abusive relationships, 
was functioning well socially and academically and had no symptoms of 
psychiatric disorders.119 However, he warned that “[h]er current environment 
appears to be potentially unstable, unpredictable, and possibly violent. . . . Indeed, 
her current lack of psychiatric pathology is a tribute to her psychological resilience 
rather than her being in an ideal environmental setting.”120 The court recognized 
that the mother had been Brianna’s primary caregiver and gave her some credit for 
Brianna’s well-being.121 But the court endorsed the psychiatrist’s assertion that 
Brianna’s “psychological resilience” was largely responsible for her mental health 
and successes at school, and it awarded custody to the father.122 Despite Brianna’s 
mother’s achievement of providing her with “a suitable home, education and the 
necessities” while dealing with turbulence in her own life, the court decided to 
transfer custody to the father.123 Courts do not recognize abused mothers’ good 
parenting in bad situations.124 This tendency illustrates Mary Becker’s argument 
that “our culture tends to deny and hence undervalue women’s caretaking of 
children.”125 Mothering by abused women becomes invisible; the value of 
Brianna’s mother’s seven years of caretaking, which resulted in an apparently 
happy and healthy child, was not given much weight by the courts. 
D. Awarding Custody to Batterers 
In some cases, courts have transferred custody from a mother who was abused 
by a new intimate partner to a father who had been abusive toward her in the past. 
In Handley v. Handley, the mother testified that she had been abused by the father 
during their marriage and that her children had told her about domestic violence 
between the father and his new girlfriend.126 A friend who testified also supported 
                                                                                                                 
(citing child’s poor academic performance as proof of the negative effect on the child of 
exposure to domestic violence). 
 118. See Morrill et al., supra note 37, at 1077; Van Horn et al., supra note 35, at 52; 
supra text accompanying note 37. 
 119. 1999 WL 285891, at *2. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at *7. 
 122. Id. at *7–8. 
 123. Id. at *7. 
 124. See also P.C. v. S.C., No. 2008-CA-001873-ME, 2009 WL 960682, at *2–3 (Ky. Ct. 
App. Apr. 10, 2009). The trial court spoke to the child and found that he “is an engaging 
young man and excelled in his academic performance at school. He would benefit from the 
increased stability of living primarily with his father.” Id. at *3 (quoting trial court’s 
opinion). 
 125. Becker, supra note 47, at 204. 
 126. No. CA 08-21, 2008 WL 4724105, at *4 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2008). Some 
evidence indicated that the mother in Handley had herself been violent, but she claimed that 
her violence was all in self-defense. Id. at *3. 
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these allegations about the father’s violence.127 The trial court transferred custody 
to the father, in part because it did not believe the mother’s testimony.128 
Even in cases where there was strong evidence of domestic violence by the 
father, courts have transferred custody.129 In Fisher v. Fisher, the father had been 
convicted of battery upon the mother during their marriage, which had ended six 
years before.130 The mother was subsequently battered by her second husband, and 
the court transferred custody of the children to the father in part because of the 
domestic violence in the mother’s new relationship.131 Neither the trial court nor 
the appellate court discussed the father’s conviction for domestic battery, except to 
mention it in passing.132 
These cases reflect courts’ confused attitude toward domestic violence. Courts 
emphasize the seriousness of the domestic violence in the mother’s new 
relationship (where the mother is the victim) while simultaneously discounting or 
disbelieving evidence that the father himself perpetrated domestic violence in the 
past. Courts are even willing to ignore previous convictions for domestic 




                                                                                                                 
 
 127. See id. at *6. 
 128. See id. at *4. The trial court noted the mother’s testimony about the abuse, but put 
more weight on the fact that the mother had wanted to reconcile with the father at some 
point. Id. “The trial court noted that if [the father] was an abuser and [the mother] wanted to 
go back to him, then [she] needed serious counseling.” Id. The trial court viewed the mother 
as either crazy or a liar. 
 129. In another case where there was an official record of domestic violence, Wentland v. 
Rousseau, the trial court apparently did not mention the father’s criminal conviction for 
assaulting the mother in making its decision to grant custody to the father because of 
domestic violence in the mother’s new relationship. 875 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282–83 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2009). The appellate court held that the trial court’s focus “on the mother’s and [her 
abusive boyfriend’s] recent behavior and their admitted abuse of alcohol,” without 
discussion of the older criminal conviction, was appropriate. Id. at 283. Wentland is an initial 
custody determination rather than a custody modification case because the parents had never 
entered into a formal custody agreement. Id. at 281–82. But since the child had lived 
primarily with the mother for about four years after the parents broke up, it presents similar 
issues even though the court only performed a “best interests” analysis rather than the two-
step custody modification analysis. See id.  
 130. No. 37A03-0609-CV-415, 2007 WL 914621, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2007). 
 131. Id. at *3. 
 132. See id. at *1. Another example of a court transferring custody to an abusive father is 
Rongstad v. Rongstad, No. C1-00-1727, 2001 WL 1328404 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2001). 
In Rongstad, the mother claimed the trial court “refused to hear evidence” of the father’s 
“abusive nature.” Id. at *3. The court transferred custody to the father because of domestic 
violence perpetrated by the mother’s second husband and because of the mother’s illegal 
drug use. Id. In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the appellate court stated: “We . . . note 
the evidence of some violence during [the mother and father’s] marriage. But the record 
shows that the children were exposed to far greater levels of violence after that marriage 
ended and [the mother] became involved with [her second husband].” Id. 
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This Part has argued that courts do not recognize that abused mothers’ problems 
with financial instability, emotional instability, and drug and alcohol abuse are 
often related to domestic violence. Courts often cite these problems as independent 
reasons to take custody away from mothers in favor of fathers. In addition, courts 
often blame mothers for their abusive relationships with new intimate partners, and 
courts seem to believe that abused mothers are not capable of good parenting, even 
after they end abusive relationships or take steps to address the violence. Finally, 
courts sometimes transfer custody to a father who has committed domestic violence 
in the past, which demonstrates uncertainty on the courts’ part about the 
seriousness of domestic violence. 
IV. SHOULD WE CONSIDER FAIRNESS TO MOTHERS? 
The cases described in Part III illustrate the variety of ways in which courts are 
biased against abused mothers in custody modification decisions. But fairness to 
the parents is not supposed to be the paramount concern in custody cases; rather, 
the best interests standard requires courts to focus on the needs of the child.133 Even 
if you agree that courts blame abused mothers for the domestic violence and view 
them as inherently poor parents, as argued in Part III, you may consider this 
unfairness to be simply irrelevant if you believe that courts are appropriately 
focused on the best interests of the child.  
This Part argues that courts are not making (and probably cannot make) custody 
modification decisions that are focused solely on some objective understanding of 
what is best for the child, and it argues that the unfair decisions courts are currently 
making are harmful to both mothers and children. 
A. The Ideal of an Objective “Best Interests” Analysis 
Many courts and observers believe that courts are able to make custody 
decisions that are truly focused solely on the best interests of the child. For 
example, in Iverson v. Griffith, a case involving a mother who relocated multiple 
times to get away from abusive relationships, the Alaska Supreme Court argued 
that fairness to the mother is simply irrelevant in determining the best interests of 
the child: 
[The mother] argues that the superior court erred by considering her 
moves because doing so penalized her for leaving abusive partners. 
[She] explains that court consideration of relocations places her and 
other victims of domestic violence in a Catch-22. The victim of 
violence would be criticized for staying with her child in the home of 
an abusive partner but is deemed to offer an unstable living situation if 
she moves out. While [the mother] may be correct that the superior 
court would look unfavorably at the home she offers in either 
                                                                                                                 
 
 133. E.g., Mayes v. Hagen, No. 09-1068, 2010 WL 625050, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 24, 
2010) (“When we determine physical care, our primary concern is the best interests of the 
child, not the perceived fairness to the parents.” (citing In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 
N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa 2007))). 
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circumstance, she is incorrect when she views this result as a penalty to 
her. The superior court is charged with determining the best interests of 
the child, and if one parent is repeatedly faced with either moving or 
remaining in an abusive relationship, it could well be in the child’s best 
interest to live with the other parent.134 
This passage presents the trial court’s decision about the best interests of the child 
as neutral and removed from the pettiness of punishing or rewarding parents. In 
fact, decisions about the best interests of the child do involve direct and detailed 
comparison of parents. Courts making custody decisions look at a number of 
intimate factors about the parents’ lives, including the child’s relationship with 
each parent; the parents’ and child’s wishes; the home, school, and community that 
each parent could provide; and the mental and physical health of the parents.135 
Under this framework, judges are required to compare the lives and personalities of 
the parents in order to reach their decisions. It is inevitable that judges’ own values 
and biases enter their analysis because, as Katharine Bartlett points out, there is no 
generally agreed-upon definition about exactly what the “best interests of the child” 
should mean: 
[T]here are many ways to think about the child’s best interests. In 
serving these interests, there are many different goals that we might be 
trying to achieve—continuity, emotional security, discipline, safety, 
citizenship values, creativity, academic achievement, absence of race or 
sex bias—and these goals might not all point in the same direction.136 
The uncertainty of the best interests standard and the fact that judges have to make 
comparisons about intimate details of parents’ lives mean that the ideal of the 
completely neutral family law judge who considers only the interests of the child is 
not realistic.137 Bias against abused mothers in custody modification cases is not, 
therefore, irrelevant. It affects how courts evaluate what would be best for the child, 
and it affects outcomes. The next subpart argues that these effects are harmful. 
B. The Harms of Biased Decision Making in Custody Modification Cases 
1. Unnecessary Transfers of Custody 
The most concrete and immediate harm of the current bias against abused 
mothers in custody modification cases is that it increases the likelihood of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. No. S-11843, 2006 WL 2578692, at *6 n.20 (Alaska Sept. 6, 2006). 
 135. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8 (West 2008). The Indiana best interests 
statute, which is fairly representative of other states’ statutes, requires courts to consider the 
following factors: the child’s age and sex; the child’s relationship with each parent; the 
parents’ and child’s wishes; the child’s adjustment to home, school, and community; the 
mental and physical health of all involved; and evidence of domestic violence. Id. 
 136. Bartlett, supra note 22, at 468. 
 137. Cf. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 19, at 157–58. In his critique of the best interests 
standard, Guggenheim argues that this child-centered ideal is powerful and widespread, but 
not accurate. Id.  
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unnecessary transfers of custody. If we accept that courts necessarily make value-
based comparisons between parents when modifying custody, as argued above in 
Part IV.A, and that courts are currently biased against abused mothers in these 
cases, as argued in Part III, it is likely that courts sometimes transfer custody to the 
father when doing so is not really necessary to protect the best interests of the child. 
Some of the cases described in Part III represent this type of unnecessary custody 
modification. When a court transfers custody even after the mother has ended the 
abusive relationship, for example, it may be an unnecessary modification that the 
court justifies by the assumption that a mother is a “bad mother” because she was 
in an abusive relationship.138 Similarly, a judge who believes that all abused 
mothers are dysfunctional is more likely to order custody modification even if it 
would be possible for the child to stay with his or her mother.139 
In some of the cases described in this Note, judges may err on the side of 
transferring custody to the father because they believe that exposure to domestic 
violence is always permanently harmful to children.140 But, as described above, 
research shows that some children who are exposed to domestic violence are 
affected more than others; some suffer severe negative psychological effects while 
a significant number seem to recover completely after the immediate danger is 
addressed.141 This variation in how children react to exposure to domestic violence, 
which depends on factors such as parents’ mental health and parenting skills, the 
family’s social support, and the child’s individual coping skills, temperament, and 
feelings of control,142 is too unpredictable and fact-specific to support a rule in 
favor of automatic transfer of custody.143  
It is widely accepted by the courts that unnecessary changes of custody are 
harmful to children and should be avoided; courts have “repeatedly emphasized 
that continuation of the child’s successful relationship with the primary caregiver 
normally provides stability that outweighs possible advantages that might result 
from a custodial change.”144 Experts stress the importance of “a consistent 
relationship with a primary caretaker to a child’s health development.”145 
In the cases described in this Note, transferring custody away from the mother 
often creates considerable disruption in the child’s life. In most cases, the mother 
had been the primary caretaker since the child was very young. For example, in 
Peters v. Peters, the mother had been the primary caretaker for her daughter’s 
whole life, and she had primary custody from when the child was two until the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 138. See supra Part III.B.2.  
 139. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 140. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra Part II.A. 
 142. See Hughes & Luke, supra note 44, at 206–10 (describing factors that are believed 
to contribute to children’s adjustment after exposure to domestic violence). 
 143. Cf. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 250–51 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding 
that New York’s policy of automatically removing children from abused mothers and putting 
them in foster care did not further the state interest in protecting children). 
 144. Peters v. Peters, No. 02A01-9810-CH-00283, 1999 WL 285891, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. May 10, 1999).  
 145. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 199 (describing expert testimony of Dr. Evan Stark). 
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child was nine.146 The trial court, which denied the father’s request for custody 
modification, recognized that a change in custody would “remove the child from 
the custody of a dutiful and loving mother, away from her friends and family into 
an environment to which she is only vaguely familiar.”147 But the appellate court 
reversed the trial court’s decision and ordered a change in custody to the father 
because of its concern about exposure to domestic violence.148 Since protecting 
primary caretaker relationships and preserving continuity in the child’s life are 
important to the courts,149 this kind of change in the child’s life should only be 
undertaken when truly necessary.  
Getting rid of bias against abused mothers would result in better outcomes 
because it would prevent unnecessary transfers of custody. At the very least, it 
can’t possibly hurt children, because a court that does not blame the mother for her 
victimization or subscribe to negative stereotypes of abused mothers as a group 
would still be able to find that a change in custody is appropriate because of the 
threat of exposure to domestic violence in a particular case. 
2. Discouraging Abused Mothers from Seeking Help 
If mothers know that they will lose custody of their children because of 
domestic violence by their new boyfriends or husbands, they will be less likely to 
seek help from the courts, police, or state agencies. Seeking help creates records 
like police reports and protective orders that can then be used against mothers in 
custody modification cases. In many of the cases described in Part III, courts relied 
on these types of official records in support of their decision to transfer custody to 
the father.150 In T.L. v. T.M., for example, the court admitted a police report about 
the arrest of the mother’s boyfriend for domestic violence as well as police 
photographs of the mother’s injuries.151 The mother objected to admission of these 
records as hearsay, but the court of appeals upheld their admission under the prior 
inconsistent statements exception because the mother had denied the domestic 
violence.152  
Mothers in these cases are in a difficult position; they can admit that their 
children were exposed to domestic violence, which by itself may be enough for the 
court to transfer custody, or they can try to deny or minimize the violence, in which 
case the court may fault them for not recognizing the danger to their children. In 
this situation, it would be logical for mothers who believe that it is best for their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. 1999 WL 285891, at *7. The trial court denied the request for custody modification 
when the child was seven years old, but the appellate court reversed and transferred custody 
to the father when the child was nine. Id. at *2–3. 
 147. Id. at *3. 
 148. Id. at *8. 
 149. See Harris, supra note 18, at 172 (“Today, statutes or case law in all jurisdictions 
provide that placing a child with the primary caretaker is at least important for courts to 
consider in making the best interests decision.”). 
 150. See, e.g., Peters, 1999 WL 285891, at *1 (discussing police response to a domestic 
violence call and a restraining order).  
 151. No. 2007-CA-001877-ME, 2008 WL 4271038, at *7 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2008). 
 152. Id. 
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children to stay with them to avoid calling the police and to not pursue protective 
orders against their abusive boyfriends or husbands—obviously not a good 
outcome. 
3. Reinforcing the Belief that Domestic Violence Is the Victim’s Fault 
More generally, the courts’ current willingness to transfer custody because of 
domestic violence reinforces the idea that the violence is the victim’s fault (even if 
the court insists that it is considering only the best interests of the child). When 
courts say that abused mothers make “poor decisions” by allowing their abusive 
intimate partners in their lives,153 or that abused mothers have the “personality 
trait” of being abused,154 courts are reinforcing the already powerful myth that 
victims are to blame for domestic violence.155 By making biased decisions, courts 
are legitimizing biased views of abused mothers. This legitimization of bias 
impacts not only the abused mothers and other direct participants in particular 
cases, but also lawyers, court staff, and others involved in the judicial system.  
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
A. Case Examples 
In some cases, courts deny fathers’ requests for modification of custody despite 
finding that the children had been exposed to domestic violence while in the 
mothers’ care. This subpart describes cases in which courts have reached this 
decision in a way that recognizes the context of domestic violence and refuses to 
blame mothers for the violence. There are two main themes in these decisions: a 
strict application of the “significant change in circumstances” prong of the custody 
modification test, and a recognition of the efforts of the mother to respond to the 
abusive relationship. 
 An Indiana case, Hood v. Hood, has facts that easily could have led to a transfer 
of custody.156 The mother, Robbin, had two abusive marriages prior to her marriage 
to the father, Michael.157 After her marriage to Michael ended in divorce, Robbin 
was awarded physical custody of their child.158 Two years later, Michael asked the 
court to modify custody in response to an incident of domestic violence perpetrated 
by Robbin’s boyfriend, in which the boyfriend had pushed Robbin to the floor in 
the presence of her children.159 Robbin’s boyfriend had been charged with battery, 
and Robbin had cooperated with the police and obtained a protective order against 
him.160 After the boyfriend apologized to Robbin and her children and started anger 
                                                                                                                 
 
 153. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 154. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 155. See PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 58, at 405 (describing tendency to disbelieve 
and blame victims of domestic violence). 
 156. No. 49A02-0711-CV-996, 2008 WL 4307443 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2008). 
 157. Id. at *1–2. 
 158. Id. at *1. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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management counseling, Robbin resumed contact with him but at the time of the 
hearing was no longer in a romantic relationship with him.161 Facts like these have 
been used against mothers in other custody modification cases—a court might have 
found that Robbin had the “personality trait” of getting into abusive 
relationships,162 or that she had repeatedly made poor choices about men.163 A court 
might also have found that there was an ongoing threat from Robbin’s relationship 
with her ex-boyfriend because she had not cut off all contact with him.164 
However, the court in Hood denied Michael’s request for modification of 
custody because it found that there had not been a change in circumstances.165 The 
court of appeals agreed because it viewed her boyfriend’s violence as an isolated 
incident during a “long period[]” of no violence in Robbin’s life.166 Further, the 
court recognized Robbin’s efforts in response to the domestic violence: 
We . . . find it significant that Mother has not stayed in abusive 
relationships. After [her first husband] assaulted her, she promptly 
divorced him. When [her second husband] became physically abusive, 
Mother obtained a protective order and divorced him. . . . After [her 
most recent boyfriend] physically assaulted her, Mother cooperated in 
his prosecution. She then ended her relationship with [him] and 
obtained a protective order against him.167 
The court also characterized Robbin’s decision to let her ex-boyfriend back into her 
life168 as reasonable given the “precautions and conditions” Robbin has put in 
place.169 
The outcome in Hood seems extraordinary compared to other cases with similar 
facts. The court does not treat the mother as dysfunctional or deviant for her history 
of abusive relationships.170 And it respects the mother’s decisions about the best 
way to get out of abusive relationships. 
A court reached a similar outcome in Scott QQ v. Stephanie RR.171 In that case, 
the mother admitted that her boyfriend had abused her and that he had a drinking 
problem.172 But the court found that there had not been a change in circumstances 
because there was insufficient evidence to establish that “the mother was the victim 
of repeated domestic violence at the hands of her boyfriend or that the child 
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 162. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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 165. Hood, 2008 WL 4307443, at *4. 
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 169. Id. 
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abused women as dysfunctional or abnormal). 
 171. 905 N.Y.S.2d 347 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 
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witnessed it.”173 Further, the court found that the mother “took appropriate action 
by terminating her relationship and changing the locks.”174 
The two themes that emerge in these cases are a skeptical approach to the 
“change in circumstances” prong of the custody modification test and respect for 
the mother’s efforts toward getting out of abusive relationships. These cases are not 
“unbiased” simply because they allow the mother to retain custody—of course, a 
court could treat an abused mother fairly and still order a custody modification. 
Rather, they are unbiased because they do not rely on stereotypes about abused 
mothers and they credit mothers for their efforts to get out of abusive relationships, 
while recognizing the difficulties that this can present. 
B. Implementation 
By recognizing mothers’ efforts to get out of abusive relationships and taking a 
skeptical approach to the “change in circumstances” prong, courts avoid the harms 
created by current biased decision making in these types of custody cases.175 These 
approaches do not discourage mothers from seeking help for domestic violence 
(and they may encourage them to do so); they make unnecessary changes of 
custody less likely; and they avoid placing general blame on the victim of domestic 
violence. 
But how can better approaches to custody modification be implemented? A 
legislative solution is likely unworkable. The factors-based best interest analysis, 
which relies on extensive judicial discretion, is firmly entrenched in state laws176 
and the popular imagination.177 And in the types of cases described in this Note, it 
is probably best to retain close judicial review of the facts and circumstances 
because of the real possibility of harm to children who may be exposed to domestic 
violence.178 In addition, the cases described in this Note represent only a small 
proportion of custody modification cases, so a legislative change would likely be 
too broad and could have unintended consequences.179 
                                                                                                                 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. In another case where the court refused to modify custody, the appellate court 
stated: 
Although we are troubled by the fact that the child was exposed to the attack on 
his mother, we note that the mother, who was asleep when her then boyfriend 
broke down the door and tried to strangle her, responded appropriately to the 
incident by ending her relationship with him, having him arrested, and 
obtaining an order of protection against him. 
Martin v. Martin, 878 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
 175. See supra Part IV.B. 
 176. See supra Part I. 
 177. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 19, at 146–53. 
 178. See supra Part II.A. 
 179. On the other hand, changes in statutory language could have virtually no effect. 
Despite differences in wording of custody modification statutes in different states, see supra 
note 29, there were no notable state-to-state differences in the cases examined in this Note, 
see supra note 89 (listing the cases—thirty-nine cases from fifteen states—discussed in this 
Note). Custody modification statutes focus on factors that judges can or should consider, 
which gives judges significant discretion. This means that slight changes in wording may not 
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Because judicial discretion is and will probably remain very important in 
custody modification cases, judicial education seems to be the best way to improve 
outcomes for abused mothers in these cases. Judicial education about domestic 
violence has proven to be difficult and slow-going, but over the last twenty to thirty 
years there have been significant improvements in judges’ willingness to “respect 
women’s right to seek protection” and to believe their allegations about domestic 
violence.180 There have also been a number of projects that aim to give courts 
guidance on handling custody cases that involve domestic violence.181 
This Note has identified two approaches that avoid the harms created by biased 
decision making: a careful and skeptical application of the “change in 
circumstances” prong, and a recognition of the efforts of mothers to respond to the 
violent relationships. Encouraging judges to take these approaches, through 
education about the problems created by domestic violence and its effect on 
children, will create better outcomes for mothers and children in custody 
modification cases.  
CONCLUSION 
It is easy to criticize mothers who fail to meet our high expectations by exposing 
their children to their abusive relationships.182 But abused mothers deserve 
unbiased treatment in custody modification hearings, and their children deserve the 
opportunity to stay with their primary-caretaker mothers when possible. Custody 
modification cases involving mothers abused by their intimate partners demonstrate 
courts’ biases, and it is important that we address this problem to achieve better 
outcomes for these mothers and their children. 
  
                                                                                                                 
have much effect on how judges handle these types of cases. 
 180. Meier, supra note 59, at 669. These efforts have generally been more successful in 
cases like protective order hearings where the violence is the primary concern of the court 
proceeding. Id. 
 181. See, e.g., KEILITZ, supra note 48. 
 182. “Mothers carry enormous ideological weight in our culture. Because we consider 
that a mother’s fundamental duty is to protect her children, maternal behavior that exposes 
children to harm is viewed as unthinkable, unnatural, and incomprehensible.” SCHNEIDER, 
supra note 1, at 148. 

